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Planning as Practice of Knowing  
Simin Davoudi 
 
Abstract  
 
It is often suggested that a defining feature of planning is its interventionist nature 
which requires connecting knowledge to action. With the upsurge of evidence-based 
planning, much is rehearsed about the utilitarian necessity of making such connection. 
What is less widely discussed is the epistemological nuances and challenges of 
knowledge-action relationship. This essay aims to contribute to the latter by 
conceptualising planning as practice of knowing. This is to shift the focus from 
knowledge as something that planners have to knowing as something that planners do. 
I would argue that, rather than thinking about knowledge as having an instrumental 
place in planning, it is more useful to think about planning as practice of knowing that 
involves: knowing what, knowing how, knowing to what end and doing. Seen in this 
way, practice of knowing is a dynamic process that is: situated and provisional, 
collective and distributed, purposive and pragmatic, and mediated and contested.  
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Introduction: The evidentialist turn in planning 
 
The last two decades or so have witnessed a growing emphasis on evidence-based 
policy and practice (see for example, disP, 2006).  In Britain, planning has been 
particularly targeted as an area of public policy which has to be “front-loaded” with 
evidence base, meaning that planners should “gather evidence about their area … at 
the earliest stage in the preparation of the development plan” (ODPM, 2004:32). Plans 
are considered “sound” if they “are founded on a robust and credible evidence base” 
(ibid: 39-40). If they fail this “test of soundness”, which is conducted by an 
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independent panel, they have to be taken back to the drawing board and be supported 
by better “evidence and reasoning” (ibid).  There is nothing wrong with the attempts 
to improve the knowledge base of planning. What is problematic is that: evidence is 
often understood as synonymous with facts; robust and credible is interpreted as 
quantitative and measurable; ‘front’ is seen as an identifiable moment in time when 
plan making begins; and, ‘loading’ is considered as pouring a certain quantity of 
evidence into a plan-making ‘container’.  The chosen terminologies are indicative of a 
limited technical rational view of planning which perceives an instrumental place for 
evidence in the policy process. This view perpetuates the Geddesian dictum of 
‘survey before plan’, and assumes a linear and unproblematic process that begins with 
the collection of often descriptive data and ends with a blue print. The instrumental 
view of policy-evidence interface underpins other areas of public policy and 
particularly the health sector where it originated from (Davies et al., 1999). As I have 
argued elsewhere (Davoudi, 2006; Davoudi, 2012; Davoudi, 2015) its ethos is 
Popperian. It it is predicated on the assumption that better evidence necessarily leads 
to better policy; that science should be given a position of superiority and should 
determine rather than contribute to policy making. The over-statement of the role of 
evidence is reflected in the expectation from policy makers to become “professionals” 
and have “a grounding in economics, statistics and relevant scientific disciplines in 
order to act as ‘intelligent customers’ for complex policy evidence” (Cabinet Office 
1999:36). This assumes that being enlightened by science always leads to being 
committed to the actions derived from it. Notions such as ‘front-loading’ are 
symptomatic of conceiving planning as a linear process in which evidence for well-
defined and neatly-structured problems are gathered first before solutions are 
formulated. This fails to acknowledge the mismatch between such an ideal world of 
planning and its actual disordered, uncertain and essentially political realities (Young 
et al., 2002; Davoudi, 2006; Davoudi, 2015). Despite the extensive critique of this 
instrumental rationality (at least since Lindblom, 1959), it keeps creeping back into 
policy rhetoric, albeit dressed up in new vocabularies such as evidence-based 
planning. Elsewhere, I have suggested that in the messy world of planning and policy 
making, evidence can be best considered as playing an enlightening rather than 
determining role; that, it is more appropriate to talk about policy being informed by 
rather than being based on evidence. Furthermore, the emphasis should be on the role 
of evidence as a contributor to the wider public debate rather than the narrow domain 
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of policy. In other words, emphasis should be on “evidence-informed society” 
(Davoudi, 2006: 22 drawing on Smith, 1996).  
 
In this essay, my aim is to shift the focus of debate away from evidence altogether 
because the term evidence has only limited utility in understanding the nature of 
planning activity and the role of knowledge in it. I would argue that it is more helpful 
if we turn our attention towards the concept of knowing, and conceptualise planning 
activity as practice of knowing
i
. Instead of considering evidence as something that 
planners have (or seek to gain) we should focus on practice of knowing as something 
that planners do. Instead of thinking about knowledge as having an instrumental place 
in the planning process (i.e. to inform action), it is more useful to think about planning 
as a process of knowing and learning. This means articulating knowledge and action 
as recursively interlinked rather than considering the former as a precondition to, or 
coming before, the latter in a linear, causal chain. To conceive of planning as practice 
of knowing requires an understanding of the complex interrelationship between: 
knowing what (cognitive / theoretical knowledge), knowing how (skills / technical 
knowledge), knowing to what end (moral choices) and doing (action / practice). 
Together, these multiple forms of knowing provide the foundation for the art of 
practical judgement (wisdom). In the following account, I will first elaborate on these 
in turn without suggesting that they are separate from each other. I will then discuss 
(following Blackler, 1995) practice of knowing as a dynamic process that is: situated 
and provisional, collective and distributed, pragmatic and purposive, and mediated 
and contested. I will end the essay with some concluding remarks.   
 
Knowing what
ii
  
 
‘Planners do not uncover facts like geologists do, but rather, like lawyers, they 
organise facts as evidence within different arguments…all engage in 
persuasive rational arguments …focused and attached to value objectives’ 
(Hoch, 1994:105).   
 
This statement invokes that facts and information are not in themselves evidence; they 
become evidence when they are used in conjunction with other information to prove 
or disprove a proposition. Evidence is described as “information bearing on the truth 
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or falsity of a proposition” (Audi, 1996:252).  In this broader sense, evidence plays an 
important, albeit contested, role in the understanding of knowledge and rationality. It 
provides the epistemic justification for scientific knowledge claims. Hence, it is 
argued that, “one has knowledge only when one has a true belief based on very strong 
evidence” (Ibid). Here, knowledge is defined, following Plato, as ‘justified, true 
belief’, with justification provided by scientific evidence. It is this kind of scientific 
knowledge that Aristotle calls episteme. “Its goal is truth, and its matter is belief” 
(Scruton, 1996: 325). It is this limited epistemic view of knowledge that underlies the 
growing evidentialist approach to planning.  Its central assumption is that a theory of 
cause and effect can be established between planning problems and planning solutions 
through the deployment of scientific methods by value-free expert planners. As I will 
outline below, this epistemic view of knowledge has been criticised in relation to at 
least three of its characteristics: its analysis of knowledge, its articulation of the 
sources of knowledge, and its adherence to only one type of knowledge.  
 
1. Critiques of the analysis of epistemic knowledge 
Here, the main criticism relates to the idea of fundamental truth or true belief 
(Schuman, 1987). Sceptics, for example, deny either the existence of a fundamental 
truth, or, if they agree with its existence,   the ability of human beings to establish 
what that is. Pragmatists argue that truths are beliefs that are confirmed in the course 
of experience and are, therefore, fallible and subject to revision; that there is no single 
fundamental truth. For them, truth is a pragmatic cognitive value. It is the usefulness 
of a proposition in achieving certain intellectual or practical goals (Audi, 1996:234).  
American classical pragmatists, such as Charles Sanders Pierce, William James and 
John Dewy, argue that truth, as much as belief, is characterised in terms of “tend[ing] 
to satisfy desire” (Cooper, 1999: 197). Hence, planners prefer a belief that “satisfies a 
‘vital good’ to one that does not” under three circumstances: a) if the choice is 
momentous and urgent; b) if the evidence is inconclusive; and, c) if the appeal of the 
good is overwhelming (Ungar, 1987:33). I will return to this when discussing the 
pragmatic nature of practice of knowing.  
 
2. Critiques of the sources of epistemic knowledge 
Here, the focus is on: how do we find out what truth is, which methods do we use.  
Questions such as these have led to a well-known controversy between rationalists 
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and empiricists. For empiricists, the source of knowledge lies in the bottom-up 
(inductive), specific observations which can then lead to generalisation and theory 
building (i.e. a posteriori). For rationalists, knowledge comes from top-down 
(deductive) theories and laws which can then lead to hypotheses and their 
confirmation or refutation (i.e. a priori). As Karl Popper (1963: 37, original italic) 
famously suggested, “the criterion for the scientific status of a theory is its 
falsifiability, or refutability or testability”.  In the social sciences, rationalism is 
associated largely with structuralism (as in Marxist theories
iii
) and empiricism with 
positivism (after August Comte
iv
). However, both rationalists and empiricists belong 
to the naturalist tradition of inquiry because both consider nature as independent, 
Reason as unprejudiced, and both the social and the natural world explainable through 
the deployment of a unitary scientific method (Davoudi, 2012).  
 
A radical alternative to the naturalist approaches has come from the interpretive or 
hermeneutics
v
 traditions. They argue that, both natural and social objects are located 
in “a communal background of intelligibility that preshapes how the world appears 
and who we are as agents” (Guignon, 1991:84); that the social world, in particular, 
can only be understood from within, rather than explained from without. In 
distinguishing between explanation and understanding,  Roth (1991:179) argues that, 
“explanations explain by subsuming specific cases under laws; understanding 
proceeds by making plain the rules and relations in which activities are embedded, 
and which give them their significance qua human actions”.  Roth considers 
understanding as a particular form of explanation, namely narrative explanation which 
combines explanation, interpretation and action (Wagenaar, 2011). The question, 
however, remains as to: understanding from within what? In the context of planning, 
one answer is, from within the mind of each individual planner (subjective meaning); 
another answer is, from within the social rules which render planner’s action with 
meaning (objective meaning).  Subjective meanings are concepts “we think about” 
while objective meanings are concepts “we think with” Fay (1996: 116).  Although 
difficult to untangle from each other, the separation is analytically useful as it 
highlights the distinction between what a planning action means to others and what a 
planner means by it.   
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In the social sciences (planning included), the interpretive tradition is often associated 
with constructivism, post-modernism and critical realism. What is common amongst 
them is the idea that knowledge is socially constructed and historically contingent; 
that we interpret the world through specific forms of language and thought that are 
situated in specific social and political contexts.  They argue that “law-like 
propositions are hard to formulate when applied to human behaviours, with their ever-
changing capacity for reflexivity” (Bastow et al., 2014:15); and for changing their 
behaviour in response to being told how they should behave in a particular way and 
why at present and in the future.  Therefore, for interpretivists, the goal of knowledge 
is less about “explaining and predicting social events and more about understanding 
what meaning and what significance the social world has for the people who live in 
it” (Gilbert, 1993:7). This includes the researchers themselves who cannot assume an 
Olympian detachment from “a scene which is kept moving by their very efforts to 
understand it” (Hollis, 2003:212)vi. It also includes planners who cannot detach 
themselves from the social world they engage with and plan for.  Interpretivism 
evokes an understanding of the scientific process which echoes Kuhn’s idea of 
paradigm change; a process characterised not as a fixed and pre-determined path of 
discovery but as a fluid and dynamic interpretation through which scientists make 
sense of the natural world (Irwin, 2001). I will elaborate on this when discussing the 
collective nature of practice of knowing.  
 
3. Critiques of the types of epistemic knowledge 
The third criticism of the epistemic view of knowledge relates to its monopolisation. 
First, it suggests that only one type of knowledge (i.e. knowing what) counts as 
knowledge and, hence, discounts other, equally important, types of knowledge 
notably, knowing how, knowing to what end and doing (I will discussed these in the 
following sections). Second, in considering knowing what as the only valid type of 
knowledge, it further applies a narrow definition of it which is limited to the bounds 
of naturalist traditions that I outlined above. Through these monopolising tendencies, 
the epistemic view of knowledge perpetuates the deep rooted assumption about its 
privileged status (Latour, 1987; Law, 1992). As I mentioned earlier, it is this 
reductionist understanding of knowledge that is implicitly promoted in the 
evidentialist turn in planning and policy making.   . 
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Knowing how   
 
Knowing how, or knowledge of acquaintance according to James (1950), refers to 
crafts and skills, or what Aristotle terms techne. It is not knowledge of theoretical 
truth (however interpreted) linked to cognitive and conceptual abilities but the 
embodied knowledge of technical know-how. In planning schools we often refer to it 
as ‘planning skills’. It ranges from drawing skills to the use of computer software and 
information technologies.  It is action-oriented and, as Zuboff (1988) argues, depends 
on people’s physical presence and their sentient and sensory information. It involves 
mastery of the means. It evolves and cumulates as planners interact with tools and 
technologies.  They construct their interpretation of technologies almost 
spontaneously while interacting with them. I will elaborate on this when discussing 
the situated nature of practice of knowing. However, it is important to note that like 
knowing what, knowing how also connotes reliability in the sense of not just the skill 
itself 
 but also its application to an end.   
 
Knowing to what end and doing  
  
It is often suggested that a significant aspect of planning is its specific attempt to 
connect forms of knowledge with forms of action in the public domain (Friedmann, 
1987). Although this succinctly captures the essence of planning activity, a misguided 
interpretation of it implies a process in which one thing (knowledge) is connected to 
another (action) while the two remain seemingly independent of each other. This is an 
instrumental understanding of action which construes practice as a mere application 
of theory; as the outcome of some forms of a priori knowledge.  It implies that 
knowledge of what and knowledge of how are enough grounds for taking action.  In 
the language of evidence-based planning, it implies that the evidence collected by 
planners can show them what to do; what policies to propose; what spatial strategies 
to promote, or what actions to take. Yet, however thoughtful (knowing what) and 
skilful (knowing how) planners may be, they may still not know what to do when it 
comes to moral choices about what course of action to take. They may not know how 
to handle the complex “social-moral environments” of the planning processes 
(Wagennar, 2004:649).  This is why knowing to what end, or the ‘knowledge of 
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ends’, as Kant calls it, is as important in planning as other types of knowledge (what 
and how). Indeed, planning is an archetypical example of Aristotle’s “practical 
discipline”vii which “concerns the doing of something not separate from the agent, 
namely, action and choice” (Audi, 1996:40).  That is why Aristotle’s discussion about 
action (praxis) is closely linked to the discussion about ethical and political life and 
about actors’ (planners’) values and social norms (Campbell, 2012).     
 
Practical judgment   
 
There is, however, another layer of complexity because, planners may know or feel 
what ought to be done but may still act against their better judgment. Aristotle’s 
response to this dilemma is phronesis or practical judgement.  He argues that for those 
equipped with phronesis virtue, desire (what ought to be done) and the right 
judgement (what is done) coincide (Audi, 1996). This means planners do what they 
know or feel is right to do, socially and politically, if they have achieved wisdom. 
Accomplishing this higher level of knowing enables them to apply their intuitive and 
informed opinions to not just what to do, but also what the consequences of their 
action are likely to be.  A virtuous planner has the ability to make practical judgment 
in a specific situation almost spontaneously. Thus, phronesis goes beyond analytical 
(episteme) and technical (techne) knowledge and involves judgements which are 
“made in the manner of a virtuous social and political actor” (Flyvbjerg, 2001:2). 
However, being a virtuous planner does not mean doing ‘good’ all the time (Ibid.), as 
I will discuss later in relation to the contested nature of practice of knowing. It does, 
however, resonate with what Gunder (2010:206, drawing on Bourdieu’s habitus) calls 
“habitual action, knowledges derived from the unconscious”.     
 
The key point is that becoming a virtuous actor (i.e. accomplishing practical wisdom) 
is less about having all the evidence a priori and more about having practical 
experience and doing.  It means being able to understand a particular complex 
environment and know what to do, even without having an articulated knowledge of 
it, by acting on it. To paraphrase Wagennar (2004), what planners know is not entirely 
held in their memory, codified rule books, data bases or websites, but is embodied in 
the actions that they are engaged in. Their knowing as embodied, embedded and 
enacted knowledge allows them to extend beyond what is known, to become 
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‘seasoned’ planners capable of making practical judgment. This challenges the 
traditional conceptions of knowledge as abstract, disembodied, individual and formal.  
 
Not all claims are knowledge claims, but everyone is knowledgeable 
 
“Much of the world’s work of problem solving is accomplished […] through 
ordinary knowledge, through social learning, and through interactive problem 
solving” (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979:91). 
 
Although knowledge is interpreted differently depending on the interpreter’s 
epistemological perspective, this does not mean that simply all claims are knowledge 
claims. Neither does it mean that knowledge is a merely normalizing discourse. It is 
true that knowledge can and should be validated but validity does not necessarily 
depend on whether “certain causal relationships” have been established (Rydin, 2007: 
56). Neither is there “an objective Archimedean point” from which planners or “any 
other all-seeing agent” (Jasanoff, 2003:394) can determine who belongs to the realm 
of expertise and who does not, and who is suited to which type of knowledge. In the 
planning processes normative knowledge in inescapably intertwined with other types 
of knowledge and wherever we cut into the process, we see a fusion of science and 
politics, facts and values, norms and techniques; all engaged in a continual, back and 
forth process in which contestation over ‘opening-up’ and ‘closing-down’viii is an ever 
present feature.  
 
All knowledge(s) carry values. They are all potentially fallible, and what counts as 
‘knowledge’ and who counts as ‘expert’ is always “contingent, historically situated, 
and grounded in practice” (Jasanoff, 2003:392). The intellectually challenging issues 
for planning theorists are not how to demarcate knowledge from ‘non-knowledge’ 
but, how such demarcations are produced, what functions they serve in channelling 
knowledge and power, what patterns of exclusion and inclusion they create (Ibid). 
The urgent agenda for planners and indeed other social scientists (see Davoudi et al, 
forthcoming) is the “problematization” of “the ensemble of discursive and non-
discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of the true and the false 
and constitutes it an object of thought” (Flynn, 1994:37 quoting Foucault).  
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Conceptualising planning as practice of knowing implies that everyone is 
knowledgeable; that the boundaries of knowledge are fluid and overlapping; and, that 
cognitions are situated and collective involving actions and interactions (Star, 1992; 
Blackler, 1995).  Much has been written about similar understanding of knowledge 
and practice particularly in the literature on pragmatism  and in relation to the 
formation of critical theory in which the performatives of action (praxis) are seen to 
be directly associated with discourse, communication and social practices. In 
planning, it has influenced the work of scholars such as Charles Hoch, John 
Friedmann, John Forester and Patsy Healey (Healey, 2009).  The main thrust of this 
body of literature is to undermine the traditional bifurcation of theory and practice and 
the construal of practice as mere application of theory. It evokes the need to 
understand human thought and action against the backdrop of everyday 
communicative endeavours, habits, skills and social practices. My aim is not to 
reiterate this work but, following Blackler (1995), to demonstrate that planning as 
practice of knowing  is a dynamic process that  is: situated and provisional, collective 
and distributed, pragmatic and purposive, and mediated and contested, as discussed 
below.    
 
Practice of knowing is situated and provisional   
 
Knowing is situated in time and space and specific to a particular context.  It is 
provisional in the sense that it is constructed and constantly changing in a context 
which itself is constantly developing. Hence, context does not simply refer to some 
form of fixed and bounded institutional (or organisational) container. It refers to “a 
dynamically integrated system of relations” (Wagenaar, 2004:648 original emphasis) 
between planners and their environment in the sense that knowledge of social and 
spatial processes becomes simultaneously a condition for and a consequence of 
planning.  This is reflected in Jean Lave’s (1988:151) use of the term “setting” to 
denote that the relationship is not a passive reaction to contextual constraints, but 
rather an active engagement with contextual opportunities. Situatedness, therefore, 
refers to this ongoing “negotiation” (Wenger, 1998) between the actors and their 
setting. As Dewey suggests, “actors do not live in but by means of an environment” 
(1938, quoted in Wagenaar, 2004: 648 original emphasis) and in interaction with 
other actors. The circumstances of action and the availability of resources shape the 
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most abstractly represented planning tasks (Star, 1992). However, the provisional 
nature of planning as practice of knowing means that it maintains “ambiguity as a 
resource for exploring differences and finding what these differences mean in more 
practical and immediate relationships” (Hoch, 2009: 221).  So, to talk about the 
context-dependent nature of knowing is not to suggest that knowing is context-
determined. By engaging in planning activity, planners simultaneously perpetuate the 
socio-political and institutional structures in which they operate and at the same time 
carve out spaces for creativity and novelty to bring about change. Their practice of 
knowing is an active process of creative interpretation of past experiences and 
established routines (Lave, 1993).  
 
Practice of knowing is distributed and collective 
 
“Judgement is communal and intersubjective; it always implicitly appeals to 
and requires testing against the opinions of other judging persons. It is not a 
faculty of Man and his universality, but of human individuals in their 
particularity and plurality” (Bernstein, 1983:219)  
 
Knowing is distributed and collective.  In a unified account of knowing and doing, 
knowing is not a separate category; it permeates social relations. It is a socially 
constructed understanding that emerges from practical collaboration. To think about 
planning as practice of knowing is to think about it as a socially-distributed activity 
system in which “collective wisdom depends on communal narratives” (Blackler, 
1995: 1036).  Stories that planners share about complex planning problems are, 
therefore, an essential part of their knowing and doing. They play a number of 
functions: they are informative because they circulate information about, for example, 
new planning policies. They are educational because they present ideas about how to 
handle a particular planning problem. Stories also perform an identity-building 
function because they demonstrate planners’ identity as professionals as well as 
contributing to the collective wisdom (Orr, 1990; Forester, 2012). It is this social and 
communal character of knowing and doing which can create virtuous social and 
political actors and enables practical judgment. Our ability to improvise in 
unstructured and unfamiliar situation depends on the extent to which “we are 
immersed in a social-moral collective that we share with our fellow actors” 
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(Wagenaar, 2004: 650). “Actions are embedded in interactions” (Strauss, 1993:24) 
and planning activities intensify the social-moral interactions and provide a fertile 
ground for knowing, acting and practical wisdom.   
 
Practice of knowing is collective and socially distributed not only because it is 
embedded in often unarticulated repository of background and past knowledge and 
experience, but also because of “what is at stake” (Wagenaar, 2004:650). The 
consequences of planning actions extend well beyond the situation that triggered such 
actions and may have long lasting social and spatial effects. Furthermore, planners’ 
action affects not only others, but also the planners themselves. It affects their 
reputation, reliability, trustworthiness, commitment and standing in their immediate 
community and beyond. Their practice of knowing and their narrative of it are their 
test of prudence. They are informed by what Forester (1999:46) calls “other-
regarding” and transcend the dichotomy between individual and community. The 
outcome is not the sum total of individual practical judgements but the expression of 
“a community of standards” and “the commonality and integrity” of a planning 
collective (Wagenaar, 2004:651).    
 
Practice of knowing is pragmatic and purposive  
 
Knowing is pragmatic in the sense that it is more concerned with consequences of 
action than the actors’ intentions (Forester, 2012).  However, it is also purposive and 
object-oriented. In any specific context, practical judgment derives from the collective 
wisdom of both what is intended and what works. As mentioned above, the 
consequence of action is not limited to material consequences. It also shapes “the 
evolving moral formation of people and politics” (Healey, 2009: 280) including the 
character and identity of actors and their standing in their communities.  Through 
practice of knowing, planners “transform the historical, cognitive, emotional, and 
experiential capital of a particular community in purposeful collective action” 
(Wagennar and Cook, 2003:151).   
 
Central to the pragmatic and purposive nature of knowing and doing is the role of trial 
and error as articulated in Donald Schon’s Reflective Practitioner (1983).  ‘Reflecting 
in action’, to use Schon’s words, is a key dimension of planning as practice of 
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knowing, especially given that planners’ action can lead to unintended and 
unexpected consequences.  Reflecting in action means that, as planners, we are not 
only “thinking when we act”, but also “doing when we act” (Forester, 2012: 9). In 
some ways planners are bricoleurs. Levi Strauss (1966: 66) used bricolage as a 
metaphor to refer to the way in which actors piece together different forms of 
resources (multiple forms knowledge, tools, technologies and materials) and adapt 
them to fit a particular purpose as they are acting and doing.  The important point is 
that the purpose itself is shaped in part by the availability and accessibility of these 
resources, and the “properties” and utilities of these resources “are uncovered in 
process” (Freeman, 2007:486).   Furthermore, none of this suggests that planners’ 
sense of the purpose and object of their activity is universal. On the contrary, planners 
as ‘situated agents’ (Bevir, 2013) work across different traditions or “epistemological 
frames” (Freeman, 2007:490). These shape not only their socio-political ways of 
knowing and doing, but also their ways of understanding the objects and purpose of 
their activity.  Some may frame their work in administrative – regulatory terms, others 
may see it as shaping socio-spatial processes, and a third may consider it as strategic 
and integrative; and so on. Different planners, even within the same organisation, may 
enact different conceptions of what planning activity is about. These differences can 
be sources of conflict and contention, but they can also be sources of innovation and 
transformation.   
 
Practice of knowing is mediated and contested     
 
  
“The struggle to define the situation, and thereby to determine the direction of 
public policy, is always both intellectual and political. Views of reality are 
both cognitive constructs […] and instruments of political power” (Schon, 
1983: 348)    
 
To suggest that knowing is contested is to acknowledge that knowing and power are 
mutually dependent; that the strategic alignments that constitute each include similar 
relations.  In this conceptualisation of power/knowledge, power is not about a 
capacity that someone does or does not have. It “is not something that is acquired, 
seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away” (Foucault, 
1978:94). It is dynamic, “produced from one moment to the next” (Ibid: 93), and co-
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constituted by those who support it and those who resist it (Rouse, 1994: 109).  This 
conception of power overcome the semantic separation of power to and power over. 
To understood power, we need to focus on the ways in which it is exercised, including 
through claims of knowledge which, as Latour and Woolgar (1979) argue, are often 
examples of exclusion, collusion and domination. 
 
Furthermore, relations of power are not direct lines between powerful (oppressors) 
and powerless (oppressed). They are, as Foucault (1982) suggests, complex fields in 
which all actors are involved and through which their actions and identities are 
shaped.  “Power is exercised upon the dominant as well as on the dominated; there is 
a process self-formation […] involved” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983:186).  Through 
fields of power not only knowing and doing are shaped but also identities are 
constructed. The exercise of power shapes planners’ identities and makes them know 
and do. But in doing so it constructs the reality that planners take for granted 
(Fischler, 1995: 45). It shapes their sense of “what counts as self-evident, universal 
and necessary” (Foucault, 1991: 76); what counts as knowledge and how the object of 
planning should be known and acted upon. The unity of knowledge and action is 
demonstrated in Foucault’s description of practice  as “the point of linkage of what 
one says and what one does, of the rules one prescribes to oneself and the reasons one 
ascribes, of projects and of evidences” (Foucault, 1980a:42).  Planning as practice of 
knowing both prescribes what is to be done and codifies what is to be known. 
Foucault (1980a:47) calls the former the “judicative” (regulating ways of acting) and 
the latter the “verdicative” (producing legitimating discourse) characteristics of 
practice. His power/knowledge dyad is an elaboration of these twofold dimensions of 
practice (Foucault, 1980b) in which power is a positive concept, functioning in “our 
divisions of true and false, the good and evil, as well as in the distinction and control 
of ourselves and one another” (Flynn, 1994).  Power plays a productive role because 
constraint is a condition of action. 
 
Power is exercised through forms of representations (or encoded knowledge) such as 
language, signs, metaphors and symbols. These enable collective narratives, negotiate 
priorities, signal group identities and help build communities; they are means by 
which planners give meanings to their action and, hence, are integral to the enactment 
of practical judgment.  However, these are selective abstractions that amplify some 
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concerns and mask others. As Fischler (1995:24) argues, the symbols (such as 
diagrams and charts) that planners use to represent the city complement their political 
representation of which groups represent urban society. They are different “means of 
persuasion” (Wrong, 1988:33) which play their part in the contested practice of 
knowing. Another particularly powerful means of persuasion is rhetoric or opinion 
(doxa)
ix
. Contrary to the teaching of Plato which suggests that even the best of 
opinions are blind, and that the domain of doxa enslaves us to the prevailing public 
opinions, Aristotle suggests that they can provide a plausible premise for an argument. 
This is particularly the case when opinions are not passively received but actively 
made (as is the case with planning doctorines such as the greenbelt in Britain).  
 
Power is also exercised through systems of formal rules (such as laws and regulations 
and professional codes) and informal social and cultural rules.  Formal planning rules 
about substantive or procedural matters play an important part in shaping the 
dynamics of knowing and doing in planning activity.  Informal rules, which may not 
act as instructions, can also influence practical judgement by providing planners with 
a rich archive of prior experiences as well as what is considered ‘appropriate’. These, 
as Wagenaar (2004: 654, drawing on Beiner, 1983) argues, can help planners navigate 
the “practical-moral landscape” in which they operate.  Navigating, however 
virtuously, skilfully and thoughtfully, does not mean doing good all the time because 
determining what constitutes the ‘good’ or whose interest this good serves are highly 
normative questions (Campbell, 2006). As Flyvbjerg’s (2001:57) analysis of power 
shows, “choice must be deemed good (or bad) in relation to certain values and 
interests in order for good and bad to have meaning”. Contrary to the conventional 
portrayal of rules (both formal and informal) as fixed and rigid inhibitors of 
innovation and creativity, they are dynamic and may act as enablers of change.  As an 
integral part of power relations, rules can simultaneously impose constraints and grant 
opportunities.  They can stifle creativity and lead to ‘monorationality’, as suggested 
by Gunder (2010) and Davy (2008), but they can also trigger change by disrupting 
entrenched habits and routines. A new rule or “planning slogan” (Gunder, 2010: 207) 
can unsettle the old. It may reveal what is hidden in planners’ mundane routines, 
make them amenable to conscious deliberations, and, hence, lead to new habit 
formation (Davoudi et al., 2014).   
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Concluding remarks   
 
“Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another and theory is a 
relay from one practice to another” (Foucault and Deleuze 1990:9). 
 
Seen in this way, theory and practice, knowing and doing are relational. 
Conceptualising planning as practice of knowing means acknowledging the 
interrelationship between knowing what (theories / concepts), knowing how (skills / 
crafts), knowing to what end (moral choices) and doing (action) as shown in Figure 1. 
It is this reciprocity which provides the foundation for practical judgement (wisdom 
and prudence).  Planners may arrive at practical judgment by “combining, not 
separating, the Kantian dimensions of scientific, moral, and aesthetic understanding” 
(Healey, 2009:3). They do so not in a linear fashion of reading a text but in the 
iterative manner of comprehending a picture (Hoch, 2009). Knowledge is understood 
not as a timeless body of truth that ‘expert’ planners have internalised and ‘lay’ others 
(policy makers and citizens) can harness, but as a resource to be used in specific 
circumstances where creativity is ubiquitous.   
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
Conceptualising planning as practice of knowing is a way of developing a unified 
account of knowing (in its multiple forms) and doing in which knowing is not a 
simple matter of taking in knowledge; it involves a re-conceptualisation of that which 
is assumed to be a natural category (such as evidence, experts) as a cultural and social 
construct (Lave, 1993).  This does not necessarily mean opposing to the use of the 
term evidence. It means actively engaging in the struggle to broaden its scope to reach 
a more inclusive definition of evidence which incorporates all forms of knowing. 
Central to planning as practice of knowing are the dynamic relations between 
individual planners, their communities and their conception of planning activity. 
These relations are mediated though forms of representations, systems of rules and 
relations of power.  In this complex web of relations, knowledge is not a separate 
category, it permeates these relations which themselves are dynamic and constantly 
changing.   
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“Although Reason is (planners’) guide, it can only lead them to where they want to 
go, where their own interests and values take them” (Fischler, 1995:50). Planners’ 
values are shaped not only in planning schools and through their formal training but 
also in their day-to-day activities. Their sense of the purpose and consequences of 
their knowing and action plays a fundamental role in their practical judgement. The 
significance of knowing to what end is reflected in Foucault’s elaborate, yet insightful 
suggestion that,   “people know what they do; they frequently know why they do what 
they do; but what they don’t know is what what they do does” (quoted in Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1983: 187, emphasis added).  It is here that more thinking, theorising, 
exploring, understanding, knowing and doing is needed.  As I have sketched above, 
planning as practice of knowing is multidimensional; it is situated and provisional, 
collective and distributed, purposive and pragmatic, and mediated and contested.  
More importantly it is dynamic in the sense that new ways of knowing and doing can 
emerge if planning communities begin to re-think what Unger (1987) calls the ‘false 
necessity’ of everyday life, and fully engage with the tensions and contestations in 
their knowing and doing.  
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Figure 1: Planning as practice of knowing 
Source: The author  
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i
 Inspired by Freeman (2007) 
ii
 James (1950) calls this knowing about. 
iii
 These suggest that social relations are determined by hidden structural forces and laws 
iv
 He viewed sociology as a progressive, cumulative, explanatory and scientific project which can 
explain society according to rational logics (Gilbert, 2008)   
v
 from the Greek word hermeneus, an interpreter 
vi
 In the philosophy of science this is called double hermeneutic, or interpretation of interpretation.    
vii
 The other two types identified by Aristotle are productive disciplines and theoretical disciplines 
viii
 Terms used by Rydin (2007) 
ix
 I am grateful to Benjamin Davy for bringing this aspect to my attention.   
